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■ Economics of Small-
Business-Loan Markets
Many economists, most notably Joseph
Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, contend that
private lending institutions may indeed
fail to allocate loans efficiently because of
fundamental information problems in the
market for small-business loans. Stiglitz
and Weiss claim that rationing is a likely
outcome in credit markets with small-
business borrowers because of banks’
difficulty in getting sufficient information
about them. Banks’lack of perfect infor-
mation after evaluating loan applications
can give rise to adverse selection and
moral hazard, both of which allow the
interest rate itself to affect the riskiness 
of the loan pool. Adverse selection affects
the ability of markets to allocate credit by
price because it removes the lower-risk
borrowers from the set of potential bor-
rowers. Moral hazard reduces the ability
of prices to clear the lending markets 
by changing the strategies that borrowers
will likely pursue after they receive 
their loans. 
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In the presence of imperfect informa-
tion, both large and small banks try to
find alternative ways to identify credit-
worthy borrowers. Lending relation-
ships are one way to go about this.
Relationships between banks and
small businesses tend to be much
closer than those between banks and
large businesses. This Commentary
explains why lending relationships are
valuable to both small businesses and
banks, how they reduce information-
lending problems, and what other
solutions exist to help in the reduction.
Economists have long recognized the
importance of credit markets in the
economy. Bank lending in particular is
generally thought to be an important 
driver of economic growth. Moreover,
credit-market stability has long been
seen to be associated with economic 
stability. For instance, in the mid-
nineteenth-century classic, Lombard
Street, Walter Bagehot describes a
mechanism through which disruptions
in credit markets can be transmitted to
real economic activity. More than a 
century later, economists point to the
role played by credit markets in the
transmission of monetary policy and
credit-market disruptions as a factor
contributing to economic fluctuations,
including the Great Depression.
Studies of credit markets and the role
they play in economic growth, develop-
ment, and fluctuations often focus on the
banking system and bank lending.
Banks are viewed to be particularly
important because, through their lending
activities, they may provide important
information on production and evalua-
tion services; that is, banks make loans
to businesses whose balance sheets lack
sufficient transparency to allow direct
access to financial markets. As bankers
are far from omnipotent, lending to
opaque borrowers requires banks to
resolve the information-related prob-
lems of adverse selection and moral haz-
ard in credit markets. The first effect,
adverse selection, affects the ability of
markets to allocate credit by the lending
rate (price) because it removes the
lower-risk borrowers from the set of
potential borrowers. The second conse-
quence, moral hazard, reduces the abil-
ity of prices to clear the lending markets
by influencing the actions of borrowers.
This Economic Commentary (September
2004) reviews the analysis of financial
market equilibrium in the presence of
imperfect information. We review work
of Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss on
how the problems posed by imperfect
information—in particular adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard—can result in
credit rationing (the inability to obtain a
loan at any price). Our interest is in the
market for small-business loans, as the
opaqueness of small firms gives rise to
concerns of credit rationing. In a previ-
ous Economic Commentary, we exam-
ined whether a particular government
intervention, Small Business Administra-
tion loan guarantees, could improve the
allocation of credit to small businesses.
Absent from that discussion was the role
that private solutions, such as lending
relationships, play in reducing credit
rationing by lenders. 
Understanding the role that lending rela-
tionships play in the allocation of credit 
is central to any assessment of small- 
business-credit markets. Mitch Peterson
suggests that small-business lending is
different from large-business lending 
on three dimensions: financing costs,
information costs, and the importance of
lending relationships. Small businesses
pay a higher fixed cost per unit of credit
than larger businesses. Asymmetric
information problems associated with
small firms are more severe than with
larger firms. Relationships between
banks (typically small ones) and small
businesses are much closer than those
between large companies and banks, 
and as we explain below, are more 
valuable to both small businesses and 
to the banks. Hence, financing costs are
different for small firms. Adverse selection arises from the bank’s
inability to distinguish between high-
and low-risk borrowers. If the bank
posts a lending rate that reflects the aver-
age risk of the borrowers in the market, it
will draw a disproportionate share of
loan applications from the less-credit-
worthy borrowers. Hence, given the mix
of applications, the posted lending rate is
too low and the profitability of the bank
will suffer. But increasing the lending
rate will not solve this problem. In fact, it
will exacerbate it by causing lower-risk
borrowers to drop out of the pool of
potential borrowers. This results in the
risk of an average loan applicant at any
lending rate to be positively related to the
loan interest rate. Higher-risk borrowers
are willing to borrow at a higher interest
rate because they perceive their probabil-
ity of repaying the loan to be lower. 
So, as the interest rate rises, the average
“riskiness” of those who borrow
increases, and this may actually result 
in lowering the bank’s expected profits
from lending. Therefore, markets will be
unable to allocate credit on the basis of
price alone. 
Similarly, as the interest rate and other
terms of the contract change, the behav-
ior of the borrower is also likely to
change. For instance, raising the interest
rate decreases the profitability of projects
that succeed. Higher interest rates may
thus induce firms to undertake projects
that are riskier—ones with lower proba-
bilities of success but higher payoffs
when successful. In other words, the
price a firm pays for credit can affect its
investment decision. This is the moral-
hazard problem.
As a result of these two effects, the
bank’s expected profit may actually
decrease if the bank increases its lend-
ing rate. Clearly, under these conditions,
it is conceivable that the demand for
credit may exceed the supply of credit
in equilibrium. Traditional analysis
would argue that in the presence of an
excess demand for credit, unsatisfied
borrowers would offer to pay a higher
interest rate to the bank, bidding up the
interest rate until demand equals supply.
This does not happen in this case; the
bank would not lend to someone who
offered to pay the higher interest rate, 
as such a borrower is likely to be a
worse risk than the average current 
borrower. The expected return on a loan
to this borrower at the higher interest
rate is actually lower than the expected
return on the loans the bank is currently
making. Hence, in the absence of other
screening technologies, there are no
competitive forces leading supply to
equal demand, and credit is rationed.
■ Lending with a Personal
Touch
Lending relationships have been recog-
nized by economists as an important mar-
ket mechanism for reducing credit
rationing. One of the earliest analyses 
of lending relationships as an (at least 
partial) antidote to credit rationing was by 
Ed Kane and Burton Malkiel (1965).
Kane and Malkiel reach conclusions 
similar to Stiglitz and Weiss about the
possibility of banks rationing credit, but
they go one step further by suggesting
that lending relationships are a market
response to information problems. Kane
and Malkiel conclude that the extent to
which loan customers face credit
rationing depends on the strength of 
existing customer relationships and the
bank’s assessment of the current and
future profitability of all its business 
interactions with the borrower—including
the size, stability, and prospects for future
growth of deposits and the existence of
profitable future lending opportunities. 
In other words, banks allocate credit to
current and prospective borrowers in
accordance with the strength of the 
existing bank-borrower relationships
along with expectations about the future
profitability of those relationships.
In the lending decision, banks are often
viewed as evaluating loan customers
using the five “Cs”: character (the uncon-
ditional willingness of the borrower to
repay the loan), capacity (ability of the
borrower to repay), conditions (macro-
economic and local economic conditions
that affect the ability of the borrower to
repay), collateral (assets that can be sold
to repay the loan), and capital (net worth
of the borrower and any external guaran-
tees of the loan). In the simplest terms, a
lending relationship embodies the set of
information (some of it private informa-
tion) on a borrower’s five Cs that a bank
has collected through repeated interac-
tions with the borrower. Mitchell Peterson
and Raghuram Rajan (1994) observe that
through close and continued interaction, a
firm may provide a lender with sufficient
information about, and a voice in, the
firm’s affairs to lower the cost and
increase the availability of credit. Much of
the information collected and evaluated as
part of the lending relationship is “soft
information,” that is, information that is
difficult to quantify statistically and that
requires the informed judgment of a loan
officer—specialized human capital—to
evaluate it. 
Peterson and Rajan suggest that an
important dimension of a relationship is
its duration. Conditional on its positive
past experience with the borrower, the
bank may expect future loans to be less
risky. This should reduce its expected
cost of lending and increase its willing-
ness to provide funds. Moreover, these
authors propose that in addition to 
interaction over time, relationships can
be built through interaction over multi-
ple products. That is, borrowers may
obtain more than just loans from a bank.
Borrowers may purchase a variety of
financial services such as checking and
savings accounts. These added dimen-
sions of a relationship can affect the
firm’s borrowing cost in two ways. First,
they increase the precision of the
lender’s information about the borrower.
For example, the lender can learn about
the firm’s sales by monitoring the cash
flowing through its checking account or
by factoring the firm’s accounts receiv-
ables. Second, the lender can spread any
fixed costs of producing information
about the firm over multiple products.
Peterson and Rajan report that both
effects reduce the lender’s costs of 
providing loans and services, and the
former effect increases the availability
of funds to the firm.
Allen Berger and Greg Udell (1995) also
study the importance of relationships in
the extension of credit to small firms.
They find that small firms with longer
banking relationships borrow at lower
rates and are less likely to pledge collat-
eral than are other small firms. These
effects appear to be both economically
and statistically significant. According to
Berger and Udell, these results suggest
that banks accumulate increasing
amounts of this private information over
the duration of the bank-borrower rela-
tionship and use this information to
refine their loan-contract terms.
Overall, the available evidence points 
to a significantly positive relationship
between factors related to the strength
and duration of the lending relationships
among banks and small-business cus-
tomers and both the terms (lower loan
rates and fewer loan covenants) and
availability of credit. From the perspec-
tive of the banks, the stronger the rela-
tionship, the more likely the borrower is
to select the bank for future credit needs
and other banking services. small-business lending. Stein puts forth
the idea that the hierarchical organiza-
tional structure of most large banks
makes it difficult to utilize soft informa-
tion in the lending decision. That is, 
the layers of loan-review and loan-
underwriting decisions in large banks
often place the lending decision in the
hands of a person or committee that is
more than an arm’s length away from
the lending officer. Stein postulates that
the soft information from the relationship
is most valuable to the loan officer, and it
loses value as it is transmitted through a
lending-decision hierarchy. This reduces
the value of lending relationships to large
banks and thus reduces the incentive to
invest in relationships. Small banks, on
the other hand, tend to be flat organiza-
tions where the loan officer plays a more
central role in the lending decision.
Hence, due to their organizational struc-
ture, small banks can more fully benefit
from investing in lending relationships.
Recent studies show that the application
of credit scoring to small-business lend-
ing may have improved the allocation of
credit to small firms. The evidence shows
that transactions-based loans are made
over greater distances and for longer
periods of time than relationship-based
loans. As credit scoring does not require
a physical presence in the lending mar-
ket, large banks—through transactions
lending—can effectively enter new 
markets without the cost of establishing
branches. This, in turn, should increase
the access to credit and reduce the cost 
of borrowing for small businesses. On
the other hand, increased competition
posed by large banks may reduce the
profitability of community banks as it
reduces their ability to extract rents from
their lending relationships. In fact, a
recent paper by Emre Ergungor provides
evidence consistent with this conjecture.
■ Conclusion
Relationships are an important market
mechanism banks use to reduce infor-
mation problems in lending markets.
The value of relationships and bank-
information production in loan markets
has been documented in a number of
empirical studies, and the loss of 
important lending relationships in bank
failures provides a rationale for bank
regulation. 
With advances in information and 
communication technology, markets cer-
tainly have become more informationally
efficient. Moreover, reductions in the cost
of data storage, retrieval, and analysis,
coupled with advances in credit evalua-
tion technology, have reduced informa-
tional frictions in credit markets. This
suggests that, in the future, the cost of
credit-scoring-based lending will likely
decrease, and its use will likely increase.
However, whether credit-scoring models
will displace lending relationships as 
an important tool for small-business
lending in the future remains to be seen.
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■ An Impersonal Approach 
to Lending
An increasing number of small-business
loans are made using credit-scoring
models to assess the risk of the bor-
rower; this “cookie-cutter approach”
involves using the business owner’s
credit score as an input into the lending
decision. Credit scoring, which involves
using a statistical measure of the likeli-
hood a borrower will default, represents
an alternative technology to lending
relationships that can be used by banks.
In terms of the 5 Cs of lending, credit
scoring allows lenders to use verifiable
data on borrowers to construct a sum-
mary measure of the 5 Cs. 
Credit scoring can be used by banks as a
complement to relationships in the 
lending process. Much like a college
that uses high school grades and 
college-entrance-exam scores jointly 
in its admission decision, banks can 
use the information in a credit score in
the context of the bank relationship as
part of the lending decision. As in the
college-admission example, a strong
relationship may allow the bank to
safely lend to a borrower who would 
not receive funding based on the bor-
rower’s credit score alone. Naturally 
the opposite is true; to the extent that
credit scoring reduces the information-
related costs of lending (and the atten-
dant agency problems), borrowers are
more likely to have access to more
credit and to be on better terms earlier
in the relationship. 
Credit scoring may also be used as a
substitute for relationships. There is 
a growing amount of empirical evidence
suggesting that large banks tend to rely
on credit scoring for small-business
lending—these types of loans are often
referred to as transactions-based (or
cookie-cutter) loans. Small banks, on
the other hand, appear to be primarily
relationship-based lenders. Large 
banks can hold sizeable portfolios of
small-business loans, allowing them 
to diversify away a good deal of idio-
syncratic risk associated with individual
borrowers (who each make up a minis-
cule share of the overall small-business-
loan portfolio). Hence, for large banks
that use credit scoring to screen loan
applicants, the cost of building a rela-
tionship with a small firm may exceed
its value to the bank.
Jeremy Stein (2002) explains why large
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